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1  Background
The Japanese government is conducting electricity system reform in stages and plans to 
complete this reform by 2020. Historically, all electricity related services in Japan have 
been overseen by regional monopolistic entities. After the reform is completed, both the 
wholesale and retail electricity markets will be perfectly competitive, as in most coun-
tries in the EU, and many states in the USA and Australia (METI 2015). For the most 
part, the wholesale electricity market in Japan has already been liberalized, whereas only 
high-voltage power in the retail electricity market has been liberalized. During the next 
several years, the scope of retail electricity liberalization is expected to expand to small-
scale factories and households.
The liberalization of retail electricity is attracting considerable attention because of 
decreasing retail electricity prices and increasing electricity serving services. However, 
there are also some concerns that electricity system reform will increase peak-time 
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electricity prices and corresponding tariffs as early electricity-liberalized countries.1 
Famously, the UK electricity market saw retail electricity prices double after liberaliza-
tion. Should such price increases occur in Japan, they would become a heavy burden for 
small-scale factories and households. Our research question is straightforward. Could 
electricity system reform in Japan improve social welfare while reducing the cost of retail 
electricity? Even if improvement could be achieved, would this not be the result of some-
one’s sacrifice?
In the economic literature, although there are various studies on the efficiency and 
design of the wholesale electricity market, there is little analytical research on the role of 
electricity retailers and the effects of retail electricity liberalization.2 As far as we know, 
the only study on this area is Joskow and Tirole (2006). Joskow and Tirole (2006) exam-
ined the performances of the competitive real-time retail market given metering tech-
nology and consumer price responsiveness and showed that liberalization without the 
introduction of smart meters sometimes decreases the effectiveness of retail electricity 
trading. We applied their economic model to express electricity trading after the elec-
tricity system reform in Japan, but the aim of our study is quite different.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we develop an economic 
model for a simple but complete electricity system. We use a full electricity related eco-
nomic model, and thus this paper differs from most analytical studies on electricity trad-
ing that only focus on electricity related activities and omit many important properties 
for ease of analysis. Next, we characterize both the default and post-reform electricity 
systems in Japan. By comparing the performances of the two systems, we evaluate the 
impact of electricity system reform on social welfare, retail service efforts and retail elec-
tricity prices. We show that after the electricity system reform the peak-time retail elec-
tricity price could be higher, equal to or even lower than the default price. Including the 
case where system reform results in an electricity price drop, we show three cases where 
electricity system reform does not negatively impact small-scale factories and house-
holds. In concluding section, we summarize our findings.
2  Model
We consider a simple economy with one representative electricity generator, one rep-
resentative retailer and final consumers i = 1 . . . n. Electricity market is vertically sepa-
rated, and both wholesale and retail electricity are traded in each market at each period 
t = 1 . . .T . Following Joskow and Tirole (2006), we assume homogeneuous consumers 
differing their demand size. Then, the electricity demand function is expressed by
1 Details and results of electricity system reforms in the UK, Norway, Alberta and California are summarized by Woo 
et al. (2003).
2 Many studies on the wholesale electricity market compare two atypical auction systems, discriminatory and uniform 
price auction, which have been applied to wholesale electricity trading. Those studies are further classified based on 
whether they adopt discrete step function or continuous supply function equilibrium. Fabra et  al. (2006) is a major 
study that adopted step function, while Genc (2009) and Genc and Reynols (2011) adopted supply function equilibrium. 
Expressing wholesale electricity auction by supply function equilibrium is often criticized for not reflecting realistic dis-
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where θit denotes the size of consumer i’s demand for electricity at time t and D(·) is C2, 
a decreasing and concave function. Qt is the sum of total consumer demand at time t. Q 
is the total demand throughout the trading periods. The utility of consumer i from using 
electricity is U(qit). We assume U(·) is C2, an increasing and concave function.
A retailer purchases electricity on the wholesale market at price pwt  and retails electric-
ity to final consumers at price prt . Retail service has retail cost C(Q, e). We assume this 
retail cost increases with the total amount of traded electricity Q and that retailers can 
decrease this cost through retail service efforts e, that is, CQ > 0 and Ce < 0. Also, retail 
service efforts cost F(e) which is F(0) = 0, C2, an increasing and convex function.
Normally, supply function of wholesale electricity should be derived from the genera-
tor’s profit maximization condition that marginal generation cost equals to the whole-
sale price. However, to focus on the retail market analysis, we do not explicitly solve the 
generator’s problem but directly assume that the supply function of wholesale electricity 
is increasing function of wholesale price and expressed by S(pwt ). Therefore, the role of 
a generator here is to supply electricity according to the wholesale price. The wholesale 
price is determined by the market clearing condition of the wholesale electricity market 
at each trading period:
Finally, we assume that the information on firms’ cost is known to public and no issue of 
information asymmetry aries.
From the above settings, social welfare maximization is expressed by the following 
problem:
This can be rearranged as follows:
The FOCs of this problem are
Eq. (5) implies that marginal utility equals marginal retail cost and Eq. (6) implies mar-
ginal reduction of retail service cost equals its marginal cost. Social optimum equilib-
rium, denoted as (prot , pwot , qoit , eo) ∀i, t, is obtained from Eqs. (1), (2), (5) and (6).
3  Characterization of two systems
3.1  Electricity trading under the default system
In this section, we characterize electricity trading under both the default system and the 









































− C(Q, e)− F(e)
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(5)U ′ = pwt + CQ ∀t,
(6)−Ce = Fe.
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retailer. However, because of the public nature of the monopolistic retailer, its profits 
are restricted by law in Japan to a given level. We denote the given restricted profit level 
by π¯ . Moreover, because regulator prohibits a retailer from applying dynamic pricing 
such as time-of-use pricing, real-time pricing and critical peak pricing, charges for the 
electricity load are calculated with the single price pr for every trading period. Then the 
retailer chooses pr and e to satisfy
Then the retail price is expressed by
where pw implies the average wholesale price during all trading periods and is defined by
Under the default system, the retail price is determined by average cost pricing. As is 
often pointed out, this average pricing does not incentivize retailers to increase retail 
service efforts, because any cost reduction arising from their service effort is reflected in 
the average price, and profit remains unchanged. Then, retail price and corresponding 
electricity load are expressed by
All consumers face the same average price, calculated based on the average wholesale 
price and average retail cost independent of the trading period and their own demand 
sizes. Finally, the wholesale electricity price at t is determined by the market clearing 
condition for the wholesale electricity market:
Based on the above, the default system equilibrium (pˆr , pˆwt , qˆit , eˆ)∀i, t, is determined 
from Eqs. (8)–(11).
3.2  Retail electricity liberalization
In this section, we characterize electricity trading after the completion of the electricity 
system reform. The post-reform retail market will be perfectly liberalized, and retailers 
will be able to price freely based on retail electricity load. Following Joskow and Tirole 
(2006), we characterize the problem of a retailer assuming perfect competition as profit 
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s.t.
where U¯ is the reservation utility level. The retailer can freely determine prt and e pro-
vided the consumer’s utility does not become less than U¯ . If this constraint is violated, 
the consumer will buy their electricity from other retailers who offer electricity with a 
more attractive tariff. Because Eq. (13) is satisfied by equality at the optimum, the prob-
lem can be rearranged as
The FOCs of this problem are
Consumers determine the electricity load so as to satisfy the condition that the marginal 
utility equals the electricity price, that is, U ′ = prt . Then, the equilibrium price and cor-
responding electricity load are
Firms in competitive market do not have an incentive to discriminate a retail price 
depending on consumer demand size, because price discrimination will give arbi-
trage opportunities to other retailers. Finally, the wholesale electricity price at time 
t is determined by the market clearing condition for the wholesale electricity market. 
The reformed system equilibrium denoted by (pr∗, pw∗t , q∗it , e∗)∀i, t, is determined from 
Eqs. (11), (15)–(17) and is equivalent to the social optimum equilibrium. In contrast to 
the default system, the retail electricity price is determined by the marginal cost pricing 
and a retailer has an appropriate incentive to increase retail service efforts, thus maxi-
mizing social welfare.
Proposition 1 Define the social welfare under the optimal situation, default sys-
tem and reformed system by SWo, ˆSW  and SW ∗ , respectively. Then it holds that 
ˆSW ≤ SW ∗ = SWo. Electricity system reform improves social welfare and can attain 
social optimality.
4  Comparison of retail prices under two systems
4.1  Model specification
In this section, we specify our model to compare the results under two systems in detail. 
First, throughout the following analysis, we only consider two consumers i = 1, 2 with 
different demand sizes, given zero reservation utility and two trading periods, off-peak 
and peak, t =  off, peak. Second, we assume that retailers earn zero profit under the 
default system or π¯ = 0. Third, we specify the wholesale electricity supply function and 
retail electricity demand function by the following linear function:
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We also specify the retail service cost function by
Based on the specifications, the solutions of the two systems can be expressed by the 
following:3
Finally, to make our results more impressive, we further add the following Assump-
tion 1 and Assumption 2.
Assumption 1 The level of retail service effort before the electricity reform is zero, 
eˆ = 0, while after the reform the level is infinitely large, e∗ = ∞; i.e., cost efficiency in the 
retail electricity business improves considerably following the electricity system reform.
This assumption implies that we consider the most pessimistic situation under the 
default system where no retail service efforts are chosen and the most optimistic situa-
tion under the reformed system where significant service improvement is realized by the 
electricity system reform.
Because retailer profit is fixed under the default system, the retailer has little interest in 
retail service effort. In fact, for our economic model, any level of retail service effort can 
be a candidate for the equilibrium. To simplify our analysis, we normalize retail effort 
service under the default system to zero.
On the other hand, retail service effort after the electricity reform, e∗, is determined by 
the condition Eq. (16). The more effective the efforts or the lower their marginal cost, the 
greater the level of effort after the electricity system reform. By normalizing eˆ = 0, the 
magnitude of e∗ itself implies the magnitude of efficiency gain realized by the electric-
ity system reform and infinitely large e∗ implies that significant service improvement is 
brought by the liberalization.
Assumption 2 The parameter set of the demand size for electricity consumption is 
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(23)LowDemandDominant θ := θ1peak > θ1off = θ2peak = θ2off := θ
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Eq.  (23) implies that off-peak and peak demand result from situations of many low 
demanders and few high demanders, respectively, while Eq.  (24) implies that off-
peak and peak demand result from situations of many high demanders and fewer low 
demanders, respectively. In both cases in Assumption 2, the following relationships are 
satisfied:
Eq. (25) implies that peak-time retail electricity demand exceeds off-peak demand, and 
Eq. (26) implies that consumer 1 has a larger demand size for electricity use than con-
sumer 2.
4.2  Retail electricity price change with low demand dominant
Now, let us examine the changes brought by the electricity system reform in detail. 
Through Proposition 1, we show that the electricity system reform can improve social 
welfare, but how does the reform change electricity retail prices? Let us examine the 
magnitude of the relationship between pr∗t  and pˆr. Given Eqs.  (21) and (22) with low 
demand dominant, then
where L is defined by
By comparing Eqs. (27), (28) and (29), we obtain the following proposition.4




rL is satisfied. And if α is small enough, then pˆrL becomes never lower 
than pr∗Loff  and pr∗Loff < pˆrL < pr∗Lpeak is satisfied.
(24)HighDemandDominant θ := θ1peak = θ1off = θ2peak > θ2off := θ
(25)θ1off + θ2off < θ1peak + θ2peak,

































4 See “Appendix 2” for proof in detail.
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The order of equilibrium prices depends on the slope of the wholesale electricity sup-
ply function. This point is very important, because it implies the order of equilibrium of 
retail electricity prices is not determined within the retail electricity market itself. Thus, 
when trying to focus on retail electricity price change in the retail market, we must pay 
attention to the states of both the wholesale and retail markets.
The proposition includes the result where the equilibrium peak-time retail electric-
ity price becomes lower than the default price. Why should such a result occur? Larger 
α implies the wholesale electricity supply function is relatively flat. Remember that the 
retail electricity price depends on two factors, wholesale electricity price as a cost com-
ponent and marginal retail service cost. While the wholesale electricity price becomes 
almost constant because of its flat supply function, marginal retail service cost dimin-
ished significantly after the system reform. The default retail electricity price could 
become higher for the remaining retail service cost. This is why the peak-time price 
becomes lower than the default price.
If α is small and the wholesale electricity supply function is relatively steep, the peak-
time retail electricity price becomes higher than the default price. Rather, in this case, we 
immediately have the following corollary that could allay some of the anxiety about the 
burden from heavy electricity tariffs.
Corollary 1 It holds that |pr∗Loff − pˆrL| > |pr∗Lpeak − pˆrL|. That is, the absolute difference 
between the equilibrium peak-time retail electricity price and the default price is lower 
than for the off-peak price and the default price. Moreover, as the gap between θ  and θ  
increases, so too does the magnitude of |pr∗Loff − pˆrL| − |pr∗Lpeak − pˆrL|.
Clearly the peak-time retail electricity price rises after the system reform, but the 
impact of the reform in causing a drop in the off-peak retail price is more significant 
than its influence on peak-time prices. That is, the price gap between the off-peak and 
peak periods is not determined by the price rise but mainly by the price drop. This ten-
dency strengthens as the gap between demand sizes enlarges. Higher peak-time demand 
increases the gap between off-peak and peak-time demand. Therefore, higher peak-time 
demand is sometimes preferable and results in lower peak-time retail electricity price.
4.3  Retail electricity price change with high demand dominant
Similarly, we look at the relationship between price change and the magnitude of the 

























Page 9 of 14Sawada  Economic Structures  (2016) 5:11 
where H is defined by
By comparing Eqs. (31), (32) and (33), we have the following proposition and corollary, 
just as in the previous section.5




rH is satisfied. And if α is small enough, then pˆrH never becomes lower 
than pr∗Hoff  and pr∗Hoff < pˆrH < pr∗Hpeak is satisfied.
Corollary 2 It holds that |pr∗Hoff − pˆrH | > |pr∗Hpeak − pˆrH |. That is, the absolute value of 
the difference between the equilibrium peak-time retail electricity price and the default 
price is lower than that of the difference between the off-peak price and the default price. 
Moreover, as the gap between θ  and θ  becomes greater, so too does the magnitude of 
|pr∗Hoff − pˆ
rH | − |pr∗Hpeak − pˆ
rH |.
Although most of the results remain unchanged from the previous section, by combin-
ing the above propositions and corollaries, we finally have the following proposition that 
explains how the two parameter sets of the demand size for electricity consumption, low 
demand dominant and high demand dominant, differently affect the price change.6
Proposition 4 It holds that |prLoff − pˆrL| − |prLpeak − pˆrL| > |prHoff − pˆrH | − |prHpeak − pˆrH |. 
That is, the peak-time impact is higher in the high demand dominant scenario than the 
low demand dominant scenario.
Therefore, if the peak-time demand is formed by high demanders, that is, if most con-
sumers use electricity a lot, then the impact of the peak-time demand becomes much 
more significant. This result alone is not surprising, but as summarized in concluding 
section, when combined with the two previous corollaries, it becomes highly sugges-
tive. Whether peak-time retail electricity price negatively affects some economic agents 
depends not only on the demand size gap, θ − θ , but also on how the off-peak and peak-
time demand are constituted.
5  Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examined the retail electricity price change resulting from the cur-
rent electricity system reform in Japan. We characterize the default electricity system as 
based on average pricing and the reformed electricity system as based on marginal pric-
ing. Moreover, to sharpen our analysis, we specified some functions and only compared 
the most pessimistic case under the default system with the most optimistic case under 
the reformed system.
Contrary to the ex-ante anxiety about retail electricity price increases, we have three 











5 See “Appendix 3” for detailed proof.
6 See “Appendix 3” for detailed proof.
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after the electricity system reform. First, if the wholesale electricity supply function is 
flat, then the peak-time electricity price could become even lower than the default price. 
This result indicates that even if the target of the analysis is only electricity related activi-
ties (e.g., trading in the retail electricity market), we should use the model that contains 
all the electricity related activities (whether occurring in the retail electricity market or 
the wholesale electricity market). Analysis with the economic model focusing only on 
certain electricity related activities might miss important properties and yield mislead-
ing results.
Second, we showed that even if the wholesale supply function is steep and the peak-
time retail electricity price exceeds that in the default system, the magnitude of the price 
rise is exceeded by that of the price drop in the off-peak periods. Thus, the price gap 
between the off-peak and peak periods after the electricity system reform results mostly 
from the drop of the off-peak electricity price. Moreover, we also showed that the mag-
nitude of the peak-time price rise decreases as people use more electricity in the peak 
period.
Finally, we showed that the impact of the reform on the peak-time price also depends 
on how the peak-time itself is constituted, that is, low demand dominant or high demand 
dominant. If the peak periods are characterized not by many high demanders and few 
low demanders but by many low demanders and few high demanders, then the price 
rise in the peak periods will become smaller. This seems inconsistent with the second 
result, but the second result is obtained from the difference in the demand sizes of indi-
vidual consumers, while the third result is obtained from the difference in overall trends 
in electricity use. We must carefully distinguish the effects of these two different forms 
of electricity consumption.
One lesson from the experiences of early retail electricity-liberalized countries is 
that liberalization does not always quickly provide competition, and its impacts differ 
depending on country-specific default system. For example, many consumers retained 
their default contracts in Denmark, while in other Nordic countries a switch to reformed 
contracts proceeded smoothly (Johnsen and Olsen 2011). In that sense, our analysis has 
some problems owing to the assumption of perfect competition after the electricity sys-
tem reform. To make our analysis more realistic would require not just comparing the 
two extremes, but precisely examining the process of change. The lesson also indicates 
that our analysis could be expanded to similar target-planned electricity system reform 
in many other countries. Major results obtained from applying our framework must 
change if supposing a country-specific default system in other countries. These interest-
ing expansions are left for future studies.
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Appendix 1: Derivation of equilibrium price in the specified model
According to the specification, the marginal retail cost, average retail cost and electricity 




(1+e) and qˆit = θit(b− apˆr). By the wholesale market clear-
ing condition, Qt = αpwt , we have pwt = Qtα . Then, by the zero profit condition or π¯ = 0, 
we have the following retail electricity price under the default system:
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Corresponding Qˆoff and Qˆpeak with low demand dominant are
By Eqs. (36) and (37), Eq. (35) can be further rearranged as follows:
By solving Eq.  (38) with respect to pˆr, we have the equilibrium retail electricity price 
under the default system with low demand dominant denoted by pˆrL:
where L is defined by
Similarly, Qˆoff and Qˆpeak with high demand dominant are
And the equilibrium retail electricity price under the default system with high demand 
dominant denoted by pˆrH is
where H is defined by
Next, let us derive the equilibrium retail electricity price under the reformed system. 
Based on the model specification and assumptions, the retail electricity price under the 
reformed system is




























(36)QˆLoff = (θ1off + θ2off )(b− apˆ
r) = 2θ(b− apˆr),
(37)Qˆ
L
peak = (θ1peak + θ2peak)(b− apˆ
r) = (θ + θ)(b− apˆr).

























(41)QˆHoff = (θ1off + θ2off )(b− apˆ
r) = (θ + θ)(b− apˆr),
(42)QˆHpeak = (θ1peak + θ2peak)(b− apˆ























for t = peak, off.
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Corresponding Q∗off and Q∗peak with low demand dominant are
By using Eqs.  (46),  (47) and  (48), we have the following equilibrium retail electricity 
prices under the reformed system with low demand dominant denoted by pr∗Loff  and pr∗Lpeak:
Similarly, we can easily obtain the equilibrium retail electricity price under the 
reformed system with high demand dominant denoted by pr∗Hoff  and pr∗Hpeak, as follows:
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1
Here, we show the magnitude of the relationship among equilibrium prices derived 
in the previous section. Notice that all equilibrium prices derived as Eqs.  (38),  (43) 










then bX1+aX becomes pˆrL, pˆrH, pr∗Loff , pr∗Lpeak, pr∗Hoff  and pr∗Hpeak , respectively. The difference of 
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Moreover, the magnitude of difference is proportional to the difference between X1 and 
X2. Eqs. (53) and (54) implies that we only compare the magnitude of the relationships 








 to derive the magnitudes of the relationships among 
equilibrium prices and of the differences among them.





Again notice that L can be rearranged by �L = 1
α
[





then we can omit 1
α
 to examine the order. If α takes an infinitely large value, then 
2θ > (θ + θ) > α(θ + 3θ)+ (θ + 3θ)−
4θ(θ+θ)
θ+3θ
 holds and therefore































Finally, the difference in magnitude between the off-peak price drop and the peak-time 
price increase is
Therefore, the price change in the off-peak period is more significant, and as the differ-
ence between demand sizes (θ − θ) increases, the off-peak impact considerably exceeds 
the peak-time impact.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3, Corollary 2 and Proposition 4





. Most of the proof is the same as in the previous section. H can be rear-
ranged by �H = 1
α
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. Thus we see the order of 
α(3θ + θ)+ (3θ + θ)−
4θ(θ+θ)
θ+3θ
, (θ + θ) and 2θ .
Again, if α takes an infinitely large value, then
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The difference in magnitude between the off-peak price drop and the peak-time price 
increase is
Finally, from Eqs. (57) and (60) it holds that
Therefore, the impact of the electricity system reform on the off-peak price is more sig-
nificant in the low demand dominant scenario.
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